Abstract. We enhance the security of Schnorr blind signatures against the novel one-more-forgery of Schnorr [Sc01] and Wagner [W02] which is possible even if the discrete logarithm is hard to compute. We show two limitations of this attack. Firstly, replacing the group G by the s-fold direct product G ×s increases the work of the attack, for a given number of signer interactions, to the s-power while increasing the work of the blind signature protocol merely by a factor s. Secondly, we bound the number of additional signatures per signer interaction that can be forged effectively. That fraction of the additional forged signatures can be made arbitrarily small.
Introduction and Summary
Blind signatures are a basic primitive for anonymous electronic cash. We study the security of Schnorr blind signatures and Okamoto-Schnorr blind signatures against the one-more-forgery in which an attacker interacts some l times with the legitimate signer and produces from these l interactions l + 1 signatures. Let G be a group of prime order q for which the discrete logarithm (DL) is hard to compute, e.g. an elliptic / hyperelliptic curve or a group of units. The security of Schnorr blind signatures over G does not only require the hardness of the DL-problem. Schnorr [Sc01] introduces the ROS-problem and shows that one-more-forgeries are easy for Schnorr blind and Okamoto-Schnorr blind signatures when an algorithm is given to solve the ROS-problem. Wagner [W02] solves the ROS-problem for l + 1 = 2 t in O(2 t q 1/(t+1) )-average time and space by a tree-like general birthday method. For t = 9, |G| ≈ 2 160 this attack succeeds in O(2 25 ) average time performing 2 9 − 1 interactions with the signer. We show two limitations of this attack.
Firstly, replacing a group G by its non-cyclic s-fold direct product G ×s enhances the security against general birthday attacks. For a given number of signer interactions, the work of the attack increases to the s-power while the work of the blind signature protocol merely increases by a factor s. E.g., the general birthday attack that succeeds in O(2 25 ) average time and 2 9 − 1 interactions for a group G, |G| ≈ 2 160 , requires O(2 25 s ) average time for the product group G ×s , for the same number of interactions. Secondly, we bound the number of additional signatures per interaction that can be forged effectively by the new attack. The fraction of the additional forged signatures can be made arbitrarily small. For a given number of signer interactions, forging s additional signatures in an interleaved way requires work proportional to the s-power of the work for forging a single signature. Blind signatures differ from standard signatures in that forging two additional signatures may be infeasible, for a given number of signer interactions, even if a single additional signature can be forged with moderate work.
The critical resource for the general birthday attack is the number of interactions with the signer. The birthday attack requires many signer interactions to become efficient. This makes the attack pointless if the signer is willing to give away a few signatures for free rewarding a high volume of paid signatures. The birthday attack that forges a single signature in time 2
25 with 2 9 − 1 signer interactions amounts to an enforced 0.2 % free rate for a volume of 2 9 signatures. Such a small rebate for a high business volume is reasonable, if the attacker cannot easily increase the enforced rebate. We show that increasing the 0.2 % free rate by a factor s either increases the work 2 25 of the attack to 2 25 s or else requires to perform several, separate attacks with fewer interactions.
There are provably secure blind DL-signature protocols where the general birthday attack does not apply. However, the blind DL-signature protocols of Abe [A01] and of Pointcheval [P98] require additional public parameters and additional work. The [A01] scheme provides merely computational blindness, the [P98] scheme requires a third party checker and its security covers only synchronous attacks. This poses the question whether perfectly blind DL-signatures exist. Simplicity of the scheme is also important as it furthers its acceptance. A clear security result may help to combine the scheme with other cryptographic primitives. Therefore, Schnorr blind signatures remain attractive compared to more complicated blind signature schemes of [A01, P98] .
Schnorr Blind Signatures for Direct Product Groups
We consider blind signatures as required for anonymous digital cash. Blind signatures are generated by an interaction with the signer in such a way that the signer cannot link the generated signature to the interaction.
Schnorr signatures refer to an arbitrary group G of prime order q, a generator g of G, an arbitrary message space M , and the field Z q of integers modulo q. We first describe Schnorr signatures for the group G, and thereafter for the direct product group G ×s , where signature verification consists of s independent verifications over G. Signatures will be based on strong hash functions H :
. Our security analysis assumes that H,H are modeled as random oracles.
Private/public key pairs. The private key x of the signer is a random element of Z q . The corresponding public key is h = g x ∈ G, a random group element. We have that x = log g h.
Signing a message m ∈ M : Pick a random r ∈ R Z q , compute g r , c := H(g r , m) and z := r +cx. Output the signature (m, c, z). The result is a valid signature since we have
A signer interaction is a three round interactive protocol between the signer and a user. The signer picks a random r ∈ R Z q and sends the commitment g r to the user. The user transmits a challenge c ∈ Z q , the signer replies by sending z := r + cx ∈ Z q . We let (r, c, z) ∈ Z Blind Signature Protocol for G ×s . A protocol for generating a signature is called (perfectly) blind if the generated signature (m,c ,z ) is statistically independent of the interaction (r,c,z) that provides the view of the signer. Blind signatures cannot be linked to the signer interaction. The blindness concept is from [CP92] .
Extension to the s-fold
To generate a blind signature (m,c ,z ) the user picks random s-tuplesᾱ,β ∈ R Z 
Informal Argument for the Enhanced Security by
are statistically independent even for particular choices off where e.g.,
Informally, the birthday method of [W02] applies to random (s lg q)-bit stringsH(f , m) whereas, in the case of signatures for G, it applies to the lg qbit string H(f, m). This increases the work of the attacks to the s-power, see Section 4.1 for a formal proof. While G ×s improves the security against the birthday attack the complexity of the DL-problem remains unchanged. The sfold DL-problem for G ×s amounts to solve s DL-problems for G.
The Generic Parallel Attack on Blind Signatures
We recall in Section 3.1 the generic attack from [Sc01] when given an algorithm to solve the ROS-problem. We review in Section 3.2 Wagner's solution of the ROS-problem as a 2 t -sum problem over Z q .
One-More-Forgeries by Solving the ROS-Problem.
First, we present the generic attack for Schnorr blind signatures, and thereafter for Okamoto-Schnorr blind signatures. Okamoto-Schnorr signatures do not protect better against the generic attack than Schnorr blind signatures. The generic attack for Schnorr blind signatures uses a solution of the ROS-problem over Z q : Find an overdetermined, solvable system of linear equations modulo q with random inhomogenities. Specifically, given an oracle random function F : Z l q → Z q , find coefficients a k, ∈ Z q and a solvable system of l + 1 distinct equations (1) in the unknowns c 1 , ..., c l ∈ Z q :
(
For the generic attack we let
and an arbitrary message m k .
The attack against Schnorr blind signatures. The signer sends commitments
The attacker A selects a k,1 , ..., a k,l ∈ Z q and messages m k , and
(2) A sends the solutions c 1 , ..., c l as challenges to the signer. The signer sends back z := r + c x ∈ Z q for = 1, ..., l. For each solved equation (2) the attacker gets a valid signature (m k , c k , z k ) by setting
The attack is generic, it works for arbitrary groups with an efficient multiplication, it is intrinsic parallel. We call it the generic, parallel attack.
The aattack against Okamoto-Schnorr blind signatures. We follow the notation of [PS00] . There are two public keys h and y = g −r h −s for random secret keys r, s ∈ R Z q while log g h is unknown. A signature of message m is a tuple
The signer picks random t , u ∈ R Z q and sends commitments g = g t h u for = 1, .., l. The attacker A selects coefficients a k, ∈ Z q and messages m 1 , ..., m t , and computes 
Correctness. From the equations (2) we get that
3.2
The ROS-Problem and the 2 t -Sum Problem.
The classic birthday method finds a collision in a large list of n bit integers that are drawn uniformly at random in O(2 n/2 ) average time. Wagner's 2 t -sum algorithm [W02] generalizes the birthday method to solve the following
. . , L 2 t of elements drawn uniformly and independently at random from {0,
Wagner's algorithm solves the 2 t -sum problem over Z 
(t).
Solution of the ROS-problem with l + 1 = 2 t . Consider for simplicity the case l = 3. Solving the ROS-problem means to find a matrix Extending this method to arbitrary values l + 1 = 2 t proves Theorem 1.
Theorem 1. [W02]
The ROS-problem for l + 1 = 2 t can be solved as a 2 t -sum problem over Z q .
Simplification of Equation (3).
The ROS-solution of Theorem 1 allows to freely choose the matrix entries a k, ∈ Z q so that the coefficients A k in (3), resp. in (4) for general l, are all non-zero. Zero coefficients A k must be avoided as sum problems with fewer terms are harder to solve.
The particular matrix choice a l+1,i := −a i,i for i = 1, ..., l, a i,j := 0 for i = j, i ≤ l yields the equation
Reducing the 2 t -sum problem to the ROS-problem. Solving the 2 t -sum problem as an ROS-problem is possible for a particular class of ROS-algorithms and for a novel type of reduction. Consider the particular ROS-algorithms that generate constant coefficients A k in (3), (4) that do not depend on H.
Solving the 2 t -sum problem by ROS-algorithms with constant coefficients A k . Consider an arbitrary ROS-algorithm producing an ROS-solution matrix
with right sides H(f k , m k ). Assuming that A has maximal rank l this yields a solution of the equation This is a novel type of reduction for computational problems with random inputs. The coefficients A 1 , ..., A l+1 generated by the ROS-algorithm are used to transform the probability space of the 2 t -sum problem consisting of the lists L 1 , ..., L 2 t . This transform multiplies the elements of L k by A k , it preserves probabilities since the transform is invertible. (H(f 1 , m 1 ), ..., H(f l+1 , m l+1 ) ) since Equation (4) holds with probability 1 q for each hash tuple. Therefore, ROS-algorithms running in time q 1/t+1 must select the matrix entries a k, to focus the resulting A on a few vectors.
The case of non-constant coefficients
It seems that testing hash tuples H for several coefficient vectors A is more difficult than testing for a single A as does the 2 t -sum algorithm. This indicates that variable vectors A dont help. We conjecture that the most efficient general ROS-algorithms generate constant vectors A that do not depend on H.
3.3
Complexity of the Generic Attack.
The Generic Group Model with Random Hashes. Generic group algorithms for G do not use the binary encodings of the group elements, they access group elements only for group operations, equality tests, and random hashes. Nechaev [Ne94] proves that the discrete logarithm problem is hard in such a model. Shoup [Sh97] extends the Nechaev argument to further generic complexity lower bounds. He introduces a random encoding σ : G → S of group elements into random binary strings. Curiously, the security proofs of Shoup [Sh97] do not depend on the random σ even though [Sh97] suggests otherwise. Schnorr and Jakobsson [SJ00], [Sc01] have eliminated the random σ from the generic group model. In addition they assume that hash functions, required for various applications, are independent random functions modeled as random oracles. We call this the generic group model with random hashes (GM+ROM). Security proofs in this strong proof model merely exclude generic attacks. Contrary to the claims of some anonymous referees, we are not aware of any non generic attack to a reasonable cryptosystem. However, non generic attacks are known for artificial protocols [CGH98, F00] . 
For the generic attack letF ( (m k ,c k ,z k ) by settinḡ
Correctness. The equations (2) imply that Proof. The attacker must find a solvable system of l + 1 equations
with coefficients and unknowns in Z s q . Consider the matrix These determinant equations can be written as a system of s linear equations We study the problem of forging s additional signatures for a given number l of interactions by the general birthday method. Theorem 2 yields the following 
from a system of τ such equations for k = 1, ..., τ , see the proof of Theorem 1 [Sc01] . A generic attack that generates l + s signatures from l signer iteractions must set up the corresponding l + s equations so that they are solvable. The right sides H(f k , m k ) are independent random numbers as H is a random function.
By Corollary 2 an efficient generic attacker must generate a solvable system of l + s linear equations (2) over Z q . The fastest known attack is to forge in s separate attacks one additional signature per attack. For this the attacker solves s ROS-problems for l 1 , ..., l s signer interactions, where
Of course onemore-forgeries with fewer interactions are less efficient and s separate attacks require that s ≤ l. Next, we study fully interleaved attacks. H(f k , m k ) , has rank l too. That means that the following determinants must vanish
We simplify these determinant equations by setting a i,j := 0 for i = j, i ≤ l, and a l+j,k = −a k,k · b k,j for k = 1, .., l and independent random multipliers b k,j ∈ R Z q . Then the determinant equations become
In order to solve these equations as an l + 1-sum problem over Z s q for l + 1 = 2 t we apply the 2 t -sum algorithm to the following lists L 1 , . . . , L l+1 with elements
Here we let 
., s,
where A k,j for k = 0 is the determinant of the l × l-submatrix obtained from A by removing row (numbered) k and rows l + 1, ..., l + s except for row l + j, and A 0,0 is the determinant of the l × l-matrix consisting of the first l rows of A . Particular easy instances of such equations occur for constant coefficients A k,j that partition the s equations into classes depending on disjoint sets of hash values. No other easy instances exist for constant A k,j , and we conjecture that this is also true for non-constant A k,j that depend on H.
The Enforcable Free Rate
We study the maximal free rate that an attacker can enforce in √ q average time. The free rate is the number of additionally forged Schnorr blind signatures divided by the number of signer interactions. Using τ = √ q generic steps the attacker can recover the secret key x = log g h from h with no better probability than τ 2 /q ≈ 1 2 (Theorem 2). Therefore, the attacker is bound to one-moreforgeries via ROS-solutions (Theorem 2).
Solving the ROS-problem over Z q for l = 2 t − 1 signer interactions via Wag- E.g., at most one additional signature for G ×3 can be forged using 2 6 −1 = 65 signer interactions. This corresponds to an enforced free rate of 1 65 ≈ 1.5% for a volume of 65 paid signatures. If the signer accepts an 1.5% free rate then Schnorr blind signatures are more efficient than the computationally blind signatures of Abe [A01] . Schnorr blind signature generation costs 3 exponentiations for each of the signer and the user, i.e., 6 exponentiations in total. Signature generation according to [A01] requires a total of 9 exponentiations and additional overhead for the public parameters.
